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MAKING THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
WORK FOR VETERANS
Tom Dasche*
Nearly two centuries ago the English philosopher William Godwin
observed that "[als new cases occur the law is perpetually found defi-
cient. It is therefore . . . necessary to make new laws."' Unfortu-
nately, this precept has been disavowed by American lawmakers when
addressing the issue of veterans' benefits. During the last fifty years,
Congress has left virtually unaltered a little known, yet extremely im-
portant law which directly affects the lives of thirty million American
veterans and their dependents.2 This law, 38 U.S.C. § 21 l(a),3 provides
that:
the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under
any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing bene-
fits for veterans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and
conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall
have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in
the nature of mandamus or otherwise. 4
The denial of judicial review of administrative decisions regarding
veterans' benefits deprives American veterans and their dependents not
only of the legal rights enjoyed by other recipients of federal benefits,5
but also of rights commonly afforded even to individuals convicted of
felony offenses. 6 This unconscionable inconsistency in our democratic
system has been compounded by the United States Supreme Court's
* Member, United States House of Representatives (D-S.D.); B.A., South Dakota State Uni-
versity, 1969.
1. GODWIN, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE 400 (1793).
2. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976). The original § 5 stated:
All decisions rendered by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs under the provisions
of this title, or the regulations issued pursuant thereto, shall be final and conclusive on
all questions of law and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall
have jurisdiction to review by mandamus or otherwise any such decision.
The Economy Act of 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (1934), amended by Act of Oct. 17, 1940,
ch. 893, § 11, 54 Stat. 1193, 1197 (1941), also amended by Act of June 17, 1957, Pub. L. No.
85-56, §21 l(a), 71 Stat. 83, 92 (1958), also amended by Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-
857, §211(a), 72 Stat. 1114, 1115 (1959), also amended by Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-214, § 1(b), 79 Stat. 880, 886 (1966), also amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
358, § 4(h), 80 Stat. 12, 24 (1967), and amended by Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-376,
§ 8(a), 84 Stat. 787, 790 (1971).
3. 38 U.S.C. § 21 l(a) (1976) supra note 2.
4. Id
5. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans' Benefits.- A4
Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 905 (1975).
6. See Judicial Review of Veterans' Claims." Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Special Investi-
gations of the House Committee on Veterans'Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1980) (state-
ment of Lewis M. Milford, National Veterans Law Center) [hereinafter cited as Judicial
Review Hearings].
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holding in Feres v. United States,' which prohibits servicemen from su-
ing the Federal Government for damages under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA).8 In Feres, the Supreme Court ruled that Veterans
Administration (VA) 9 benefits are a sufficient remedy for service-re-
lated injuries and therefore resort to the FTCA is unnecessary.' °
This complete lack of independent review of Veterans Administra-
tion policies and procedures has produced unfair decisions regarding
the payment of benefits," a total disregard of scientific and medical
opinions unsupportive of VA positions, 2 and has subjected countless
7. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
8. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
9. The Veterans Administration "is an independent establishment in the executive branch of
the Government, especially created for or concerned in the administration of laws relating to
the relief and other benefits provided by law for veterans, their dependents, and their benefi-
ciaries." 38 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) (original version at ch. 863, § 1, 46 Stat. 1061 (1930)).
10. 340 U.S. at 140. The Court stated that
[tihe primary purpose of the Act (FTCA) was to extend a remedy to those who had
been without; if it incidentally benefitted those already well provided for, it appears to
have been unintentional. Congress was suffering from no plague of private bills on
the behalf of military and naval personnel, because a comprehensive system of relief
had been authorized for them and their dependents by statute.
Id
11. See, e.g., Judicial Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 319-28 (statement of Stanley G. Sommers,
National Commander, American Ex-Prisoners of War Association). See also Veterans'
Rights Newsletter, 2 VRN 21 (July-Aug. 1982).
12. JudicialReview Hearings, supra note 6, at 325 (letter from Charles Stenger, National Director
of Services, American Ex-Prisoners of War, Inc. to Sydney J. Schuman, Chairman, Board of
Veterans Appeals (Sept. 30, 1980). His letter offers the following account:
The case I will be discussing is one in which you will also be hearing from Stan
Sommers, National Commander of the American Ex-POW Association, on behalf of
the organization because of its startling and demonstrably erroneous conclusion
reached to the effect that undernutrition of the kind experienced by POWs, particu-
larly in Japanese camps during World War II, was "protective" against the specific
type of medical condition for which the veteran had submitted a claim--coronary
heart disease. We were particularly concerned that the Board chose to accept such a
far-reaching conclusion on the basis of one expert's opinion. The alternative of rely-
ing on a panel is recommended by the American Heart Association Committee on
Stress,* Strain, and Heart Disease in its 1977 report in order to assess the pathogenesis
of such a complex, long-term, multi-factorial disorder as atherosclerotic heart disease
in a particular individual. Even though such a Board decision is not technically pre-
cedent setting, it is reasonable to assume that it could be used in training or influence
the Board with similar cases in the future.
Stan asked me to comment since I had the opportunity to review the specific
sources cited by the medical expert in reaching his conclusion in the case in question.
As background, the veteran, who was age 49 at the time of the review by a special-
ist was sought, had been under treatment for arteriosclerotic heart disease for ten
years. This meant the condition probably began in his early or mid-30's, becoming
clinically evident at around age 39. BVA requested "an opinion be furnished, with
reasons thereto for as to whether the nutritional deficiency or other incidents of the
veteran's POW experience precipitated the arteriosclerotic heart disease. I assume
this included the possibility of being a contributing factor to its occurrence. He had
been a prisoner of the Japanese in World War II for some 40 months, lost approxi-
mately 50 percent of body weight at one point, and was admitted to Letterman Gen-
eral Hospital several days after release from prison camp with the admitting diagnosis
of "malnutrition, moderately severe, incurred while POW of Japan, cured on admis-
sion." "Cured" in this case almost certainly was intended to refer to the immediate
undernutrition and not to elimination of all residual consequences of the past ex-
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sick and dying veterans to needless suffering.' 3
This article will examine these policies and procedures as they affect
two groups of American veterans: (1) post-World War II and Korean
era veterans suffering from radiation exposure,' 4 and (2) Vietnam era
veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder 5 and exposure to
toxic herbicides such as Agent Orange.' 6 It will then analyze the argu-
ments in opposition to judicial review of VA policies and procedures.
Lastly, it will discuss and propose legislative reforms which, if enacted,
would open up the Veterans Administration to independent judicial
scrutiny, thereby ensuring veterans the fair treatment and benefits
which they so clearly deserve.
BACKGROUND
According to the Veterans Administration, a veteran seeking bene-
fits for a service-related injury "need do nothing more than file a
claim."' 7 "Adjudication of the claim then proceeds without the neces-
sity of the claimant further appearing at a hearing, producing further
evidence, or presenting witnesses."' 8 After receipt of military service
tended period of starvation. He claimed that malnutrition was responsible for his
coronary artery disease.
Deficiencies in the report of the medical expert were numerous. First, he cast
aside the previous medical record from Letterman General Hospital reflecting the first
hand knowledge of the treating physician with the statement: ". . . the Veteran ex-
hibited little evidence of severe under-nutrition or vitamin deficiency at the time of. or
subsequent to his release in the Fall of 1945." Apparently he based this on clinical
laboratory stories [sic] done nearly four weeks after repatriation and ignored the
clinical diagnosis of moderately severe malnutrition and statements as to the nearly 50
percent weight loss present at some point during confinement. Second, he further
documented this conclusion by reference to three specific tables in the authoriative
[sic] two-volume works by Ancel Keys and associates entitled "The Biology of
Human Starvation". He apparently accepted the data in those tables which showed
an acceptable calorie intake, moderate reduction in protein, and severe reduction in
fats of all types. He noted the only serious deficiency in this diet was in thiamine.
While such a diet under normal living conditions might, because of its low animal fat,
be protective against atherosclerotic heart disease, this is not the actual diet the POW
received. Warnings in those tables indicated the data was probably supplied from
Japanese sources and stated the diet did not allow for the fact that "the meat issue
included bones and the fish issue about half the time was so rotten as to be almost
inedible." The military medical teams visiting these camps found that malnutrition
was universal and the clinical examination on this veteran confirmed it in his case.
Yet the fact remains the medical expert ignored well-documented information and
accepted admittedly unreliable data, that fit in with a premise about low fat contents
of a normal diet as protective. A starvation diet has been shown in the same source he
quoted to have far reaching consequences on the cardiovascular system that could by
no stretch of the imagination be called protective.
13. See, e.g., Judicial Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 281-88 (statement of Steven M.
Champlin, Special Assistant to the President, Vietnam Veterans of America.)
14. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 34-55 and accompanying text.
17. Hearings on S. 636 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, House Comm. on
Veterans'Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (statement of John P. Murphy, VA General
Counsel) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 636]. (Not yet published).
18. Id.
Proceedings before the Veterans Administration are ex parte in nature. It is the obli-
gation of the Veterans Administration to assist a claimant in developing the facts
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and medical treatment records, 19 VA officials in one of the fifty-three
regional VA offices rule on the merits of the claim and notify the claim-
ant of their decision as well as his right to a hearing and appeal.20 A
claimant who wishes to challenge the decision may appeal it within the
agency to the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA) 21 in Washington.
Upon the filing of such an appeal, the Board "makes a complete and
independent de novo review of all the evidence of record."' 22 Unfortu-
nately, the BVA cannot "question the legality of the regulations and
instructions of the Administrator or the precedent opinions of the VA's
General Counsel."23 Thus, the Board lacks the authority to conduct a
review independent of official VA policies. In effect, those policies are
beyond challenge.
This lack of accountability has allowed the VA to arbitrarily deny
veterans' claims since it need not justify either the procedure followed
or the data relied upon in denying the claims. The most egregious
transgressions arise in the denial by the VA of benefits to those veterans
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), exposure to toxic
herbicides, or exposure to harmful levels of radiation.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),24 a condition recently recog-
nized by the American Psychiatric Association25 "may be characterized
by rage and feeling of betrayal, guilt over having survived, confusion
and memory problems, apathy, depression, anxiety, obsessive memo-
pertinent to his claim and to render a decision which grants him every benefit that can
be supported in law while protecting the interest of the government.
38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1982).
19. 38 C.F.R. § 3.203(a) (1982). Under this section, the veteran is required to provide his or her
record of service in order to substantiate the length, time, and character of service, as well as
to provide proof of character of discharge.
The veteran must also provide a report of examination or hospitalization to establish
entitlement to benefits or an increase in benefits. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.157(a) (1982).
20. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(e) (1982).
21. 38 U.S.C. § 4001 (1976).
The principle function of the Board is to consider all applications on appeal properly
before it, conduct hearings on appeal, evaluate the evidence of the record and enter
decisions in writing on the questions presented on appeal.
38 C.F.R. § 19.109 (1982).
22. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17, at 3.
23. Veterans' Administration Adidication Procedure and Judicial Review Act, Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Veterans'Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981) (statement of Sen. Alan
Cranston, D-Cal.).
24. The "essential feature" of PTSD is
the development of characteristic symptoms after the experiencing of a psychologi-
cally traumatic event or events outside the range of human experience usually consid-
ered to be normal. The characteristic symptoms involve reexperiencing the traumatic
event, numbing of responsiveness to, or involvement with, the external world, and a
variety of other autonomic, dysphoric, or cognitive symptoms.
KAPLAN, FREEDMAN & SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY/III 1518 (3d
ed. 1980) (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980)).
25. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980).
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ries of combat experiences, nightmares, insomnia, irritability, psycho-
somatic manifestations such as headaches, dizziness and stomach
troubles, startled reactions, fear of losing control, panic attacks, emo-
tional numbing, and frequent denial that anything [is] the matter."26 A
recent VA Department of Veterans Benefits (DVB) circular distributed
to VA regional offices defines the requisite elements of proof necessary
to establish service connection for PTSD.27 These prerequisites illus-
trate the agency's unjustified reluctance to compensate veterans for
non-traditional injuries and thus the need for judicial review of VA
policies.
According to the VA, a veteran's recovery of benefits for PTSD is
conditioned upon the presence of "objective evidence" of trauma in the
veteran's service record.2" Objective evidence includes: "official serv-
ice records indicating medals or commendations awarded for combat;
wounds suffered as a result of enemy action or for acts of valor; duty
assignment in a grave registration unit; medical or paramedical duties
on a burn ward; or experience as a prisoner of war."29 Thus, the VA's
inquiry consists solely of a review of the veteran's service record for the
presence of activities likely to cause psychological trauma. This review
focuses predominantly upon "front-line" activities.
Unfortunately, this restricted search for objective evidence disre-
gards the fact that a veteran may have been exposed to traumatic con-
ditions not reflected in his service record. As opponents of the circular
stress,
[tihe very nature of the hostilities in Vietnam which could affect even
the most 'secure' rear-eschelon [sic] troops involved stressors infre-
quently recorded in individual service records. (For example, the
bombing of a Saigon disco in 1972.) And in many instances the serv-
ices had an interest in not recording certain information. (For exam-
ple, action in Cambodia or certain activities of Navy SEAL Teams.)30
Several witnesses who appeared at a Hospitals and Health Care Sub-
committee3' hearing in March of 1983 testified that PTSD often afflicts
veterans whose service records lack objective evidence of trauma.32
Nonetheless, this policy continues as the VA consistently denies com-
pensation to veterans who cannot present objective evidence.
Fearing that the wide publicity given to PTSD has given rise to
bogus claims, the VA has recently become even more reluctant to grant
benefits. Such a policy suffers three major shortcomings. First, the VA
26. LEGACIES OF VIETNAM: COMPARATIVE ADJUSTMENT OF VETERANS AND THEIR PEERS PUR-
SUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 95-202 at 50 (Comm. Print 1981).
27. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS BENEFITS, DVB CIRCULAR 21-82-7 (May 3, 1982).
28. Id
29. Id
30. Judicial Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 22.
31. This is a subcommittee of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee.
32. H.R. 1443 and Oversight of the VA. s Readjustment Counseling Program for Vietnam-Era Vet-
erans. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hospitals and Health Care to Consider HR. 1443
and Similar H.R. 2213, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
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has been unwilling to specify the date of the alleged "wide publicity"
that has supposedly tainted the veteran population. 33 Nor has it pro-
vided for public inspection of the data used in making this determina-
tion. Second, few individuals outside of the medical profession were
even aware of the existence of PTSD prior to its being publicized.
Given this situation, many veterans suffering from PTSD may not have
realized the nature and cause of their illness until that time. Only now
could they come forward for help. Third, the VA presumes that all
veterans who filed claims after this arbitrary date were made aware of
PTSD only as a result of the publicity. Such a presumption endangers
the eligibility of those veterans not aware of the publicized information
and discriminates against veterans who live in small towns or rural ar-
eas where access to media coverage of PTSD was delayed or non-
existent.
Lack of judicial review has permitted the VA to perpetuate its pol-
icy of arbitrarily denying PTSD benefits to deserving veterans in the
face of considerable scientific and medical evidence which supports the
legitimacy of such claims. This harshly restrictive and narrow-minded
approach will continue until Congress acts to provide for the unbiased
scrutiny of their claims.
Agent Orange
Since the beginning of the controversy over the effect on humans of
the chemical defoliant Agent Orange,34 the Veterans Administration
has adamantly opposed contentions that exposure to Agent Orange
could cause cancer and lead to other adverse health effects. 35 At the
33. Letter from Max R. Woodall, Director, Compensation and Pension Service, Veterans Ad-
ministration, to Keith Snyder, Coordinator, Veterans Education Project, Inc. (Aug. 20, 1983).
34. Agent Orange is a herbicide, well known becasue of its use in the jungles of Vietnam. Sev-
eral chemicals are used for herbicides, including arsenic compounds, paraquat, diquat and
chlorophenoxy. Agent Orange is a mixture of two chlorophenoxy herbicides: 2,4-D and
2,4,5-T. One gallon of Agent Orange theoretically contained 4.21 pounds of 2,4-D and 4.41
pounds of 2,4,5-T.
The National Academy of Science (Blackman et al. 1974) reported that from Au-
gust, 1965, through February, 1971, 2,962 herbicide missions (out of a total 6,237 mis-
sions for all herbicides and all uses) for forest defoliation used Agent Orange. These
2,962 missions accounted for 90 percent of all Agent Orange used in Vietnam. From
August, 1965, through February, 1971, crop destruction missions with Agent Orange
accounted for eight percent of the herbicide applied. The remaining two percent of
Agent Orange was used in South Vietnam around base perimeters, cache sites, water-
ways, and communication lines (Blackman et al. 1974). 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T were used
for their selective effects on broadleaf plants and non-effect on grasslike plants such as
rice or seed grains.
Herbicide Orange was sprayed on 3.5 million acres from 1965 through 1970.
Ninety percent of Agent Orange was sprayed on 2.9 million acres of inland forests
and mangrove forests.
Current Status ofAgent Orange Studies,- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and In-
vestigations of the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 136-37 (1981)
(Report by the American Council of Science and Health).
35. See Oversight Hearings to Receive Testimony on Agent Orange: Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Medical Facilities and Benefits of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 356-63 (1980) (statement of Lewis M. Milford, National Veterans Law
Center) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings].
[Vol. 1 1: 1
1984] Veterans Administration
same time, the VA has exacerbated veterans' concerns about Agent Or-
ange's effects by footdragging on a congressionally-mandated study36
and openly ignoring scientific evidence which conflicts with agency
positions.37
A particularly disturbing feature of this controversy was the publi-
cation by the VA of an Agent Orange Program Guide (Program
Guide).38 The Program Guide states that Agent Orange causes no ill-
ness other than a skin condition called chloracne.39 This document has
been distributed to all VA regional offices for use in adjudicating Agent
Orange claims. It serves as the benchmark for official VA policy re-
garding Agent Orange. However, according to the National Veterans
Law Center (Law Center), a Washington-based lawyers group special-
izing in veterans law,4" the Agent Orange Program Guide was drafted
without the participation of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), or any
other government agency possessing expertise on the effects of toxic
herbicides on humans.4 The Law Center claims that "[n]o outside sci-
entific information from interested members of the public was solicited
36. An epidemiology study was mandated by the Veterans Health Programs Extension and Im-
provement Act of 1979 "to determine if there may be long-term adverse health effects...
from such exposure." Pub. L. No. 96-15 1, § 307, 93 Stat. 1092, 1097 (1979).
37. See infra notes 43, 44, 51 and accompanying text.
38. An April 17, 1978, one page intra-agency publication. Guy H. McMichael, General Counsel
for the Veterans Administration, asserts that:
• ..the program guide does not contain regulatory material, and ...it does not
constitute a 'rule' within the meaning of the APA (Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1982)) and the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(1) (1982)). In fact, a VA Program Guide is nothing more than an internal
instructional document, in the nature of a manual, which has no substantive impact
on the rights or obligations of claimants . . . . (from the Government's principle
memorandum of law filed in the White case. See infra note 46 and accompanying
text.):
". ..[t]he Agent Orange Program Guide [P.G. 21-1, section 0-181 is neither a new
rule, nor is it a change in existing rules. It is informational, designed to inform
agency employees of the existing state of factual knowledge and, to a lesser extent,
the state of the law ....
Agent Orange.- Exposure to Vietnam Veterans, Oversight Hearings. House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 244-45 (1980) (Letter from Guy H. McMi-
chael to Rep. Robert C. Eckhardt, D-Tex., Oct. 21, 1980) [hereinafter cited asAgent Orange
Exposure Hearings].
39. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 35, at 332-33. See also Wilber, Agent Orange and Dioxin.
Do 2.4 Million Plaintiffs Have a Cause 0/Action? 22 TRAUMA 1:11 (1980). Chloracne is a
disorder of the hair follicle in the skin and the specialized gland associated with it. The
gland (called the "sebaceous gland," which secretes an oily substance) produces, in this dis-
order, too much sebum. A blackhead results; in mild cases that may be all that occurs. Id. at
1:38.
40. The Law Center is a public interest law firm affiliated with the American University School
of Law, specializing in the legal problems of veterans. The Law Center is General Counsel
to the National Veterans Task Force on Agent Orange, a national coalition of veterans orga-
nizations concerned with the Agent Orange issue, General Counsel to the National Associa-
tion of Concerned Veterans, a national Vietnam veterans membership organization, and
counsel on behalf of thousands of Vietnam era and other veterans in numerous federal class
action lawsuits and federal administrative hearings. Oversight Hearings, supra note 35, at
324 (statement of the National Veterans Law Center).
41. Agent Orange Exposure Hearings, supra note 38, at 142 (statement of Lewis M. Milford,
National Veterans Law Center).
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before this document was prepared, nor was any member of the Viet-
nam veterans community consulted before the development of this
position."42
Four days after the VA Program Guide was distributed, the EPA
published a forty-page Rebuttable Presumption Against Registration
(RPAR) for the chemical 2,4,5-T, one-half of Agent Orange's chemical
composition. 43 One year later, the EPA issued an emergency suspen-
sion order banning further use of this same chemical.44 Notwithstand-
ing the EPA's contrary views on the hazards of 2,4,5-T, the VA has not
amended its Program Guide.45
In 1979, the Law Center filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate the
Program Guide, to stay all Agent Orange claims, to require public
rulemaking, and to require notification to all claimants that action on
their claims must await completion of the rulemaking.46 The Law
Center contends47 that the Program Guide violates the Freedom of In-
formation Act,4 8 as well as several rulemaking provisions of Title 5 of
the United States Code. Although the court challenge remains un-
resolved, such action has undermined the credibility of the Veterans
Administration and has created widespread hostility toward the agency
among many Vietnam veterans.49
Not surprisingly, the VA has been unresponsive to veterans' claims
seeking recovery for disabilities resulting from exposure to Agent Or-
ange." The agency continues to deny benefits despite the recent con-
clusions of an international panel of scientists that exposure to dioxin,
an uncontrolled contaminant in Agent Orange, can cause cancer in
humans.5' The VA contends that no scientific or medical consensus
exists on the alleged carcinogenicity of dioxin. 2
Ironically, in contrast to their adamant disregard for Agent Orange
42. Id
43. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,115, 17,116 (1978):
Summary: 2,4,5-Trichlorophenoxyacetic Acid (2,4,5-T) has been found to exceed cer-
tain risk criteria set forth in 40 C.F.R § 162.11. This notice requests registrants and
other interested persons to submit rebuttals and other information on the presumption
and to submit any other data on the risks and benefits of the pesticide chemical. This
notice is the first of several which will give public notification of the Agency's progress
in reviewing this chemical.
44. 44 Fed. Reg. 15,874 (1979). The emergency suspension order was issued Feb. 28, 1979.
45. Agent Orange Exposure Hearings, supra note 41, at 142 (statement of Lewis M. Milford,
National Veterans Law Center).
46. William G. White, et al. v. Max Cleland, et al., Civil Action No. 79-1426 (D.D.C. filed May
31, 1979). See also Oversight Hearings, supra note 35, at 338-41.
47. Id
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
49. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 35, at 330.
50. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 35, at 328-36.
51. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CINCINNATI, OHIO, PEER REVIEW WORKSHOP ON
DIOXINS, CONSENSUS STATEMENT (July 1983).
52. Hearings on HR. 1961. Vietnam Veterans Agent Orange Relief Act. Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Compensation, Pension and Insurance, House Veterans'Affairs Comm.,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (statement of Dorothy L. Starbuck, Chief Benefits Director, Vet-
erans Administration). (Not yet published).
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claims, the VA has consistently awarded compensation for cardiovascu-
lar conditions which allegedly afflict veterans who have suffered the
amputation of one or both legs at or above the knee.53 These awards
are based on a single study by the Medical Follow-up Agency of the
National Academy of Sciences.5 4 By all accounts, however, no consen-
sus has been reached recognizing a relationship between cardiovascular
complications and amputations.55
In light of the mounting scientific evidence of the toxicity of Agent
Orange, it is doubtful that the VA's insistent denial of Agent Orange
claims would be affirmed by a reviewing court evaluating the respective
weight of the evidence put forth by each side. The absence of such
review, however, enables the VA to continue to adhere to such out-
moded and self-serving notions of the chemical's effects.
Radiation Exposure
The arbitrary policies of the Veterans Administration extend be-
yond the evaluation of claims of Vietnam veterans. In dealing with
veterans exposed to radiation at nuclear test sites, the VA and the De-
fense Nuclear Agency (DNA)5 6 have adopted policies which serve to
bar most of the claims that are filed.57 Although the VA recognizes a
long list of disabilities potentially caused by radiation exposure, bene-
fits are granted only if the VA determines that the veteran was exposed
to harmful levels of radiation.5 8 Predictably, the official position of the
VA and the DNA is that the vast majority of veterans present during
nuclear tests did not receive such harmful exposure. 59
The soundness of this policy, however, has been called into ques-
tion by recent challenges to the effectiveness of the safety and detection
devices used by the 40,000 soldiers stationed at the Crossroads nuclear
53. Id at 321-22 (statement of Lewis M. Milford, National Veterans Law Center).
54. Id
55. VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION, 96th CONG., 1st SESS., CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SERVICE-CONNECTED AMPUTATION AND SUBSEQUENT CARDIOVASCULAR DISORDER: A RE-
VIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 71-72 (Sen.
Comm. Print 1979).
56. See Effect of Radiation on Human Health-Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation.- Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1978) (testimony of Peter Haas, Deputy Direc-
tor, Science and Technology, of the Defense Nuclear Agency) [hereinafter cited as Health
Effects Hearings]. Mr. Haas stated that the "DNA is acting as The [sic] Department of
Defense's action agency on the investigation of the possible effects of this Nation's [sic] at-
mospheric nuclear test program on participants ....
57. A Radiation Claims Procedure and a Radiations Program Guide were issued by the VA in
1979. See generallyA-Test Vets, Families Fight Cancer and U.S. Government, 68 A.B.A. J. 26,
27 (1982) [hereinafter cited as A-Test Vets].
58. See Health Effects Hearings, supra note 56, at 462 (statement of Dr. James Smith, M.D.,
Director of the Nuclear Medicine Service for the VA), at 473 (statement of Dr. William
Maloney, M.D., consultant to the VA).
59. A-Test Vets, supra note 57, at 27. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 49,090-91 (Aug. 21, 1979) for a
discussion of the findings of the Interagency Task Force on the "Report of the Interagency
Task Force on the Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation."
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test site in the South Pacific during 1946.60 The primary radiation de-
tection devices used at the site were film badges, constituting only "the
minimal equipment required to measure gamma radiation.' Unfor-
tunately, because strict enforcement of safety precautions was lacking,
many individuals did not wear the badges. 62 Consequently, the level of
radiation to which they were exposed is not determinable. Further-
more, a safety monitor at the test site noted that the film badges were
"experimental . and all too often failed to work entirely . and
[even] when they did [the results were often] erratic and misleading. 63
The same individual added that, "I do believe . . . that many of us
probably received much more ionizing radiation than the instruments
of very low beta-sensitivity were able to record."'  Additional docu-
mentation has revealed a general indifference to, and ignorance of,
proper safety precautions at the test site.65
The Crossroads incident demonstrates the total inadequacy of the
VA and DNA policy. The validity of claims arising from alleged radia-
tion exposure cannot be evaluated in terms of exposure level when no
reliable method of measuring that level exists. Yet, veterans suffering
recognized effects of radiation exposure continue to have their claims
summarily dismissed based on this procedure. Again, the lack of judi-
cial review enables the VA to ignore evidence which conflicts with es-
tablished VA policy.
ATTORNEY FEES
Another barrier to veterans seeking compensation for their injuries
is the statutory limitation on attorney fees imposed by 38 U.S.C.
§ 3404.66 This section prohibits a veteran from paying more than ten
dollars to an attorney to represent the veteran in VA proceedings.67
This provision effectively precludes veterans from retaining counsel.68
According to the American Bar Association, "the availability of at-
torneys can play an important role in highlighting areas of vagueness
and excessive discretion and in promoting effective presentation of
complex claims, e.g., the 'service-connection' cases. '" 69 Unfortunately,
section 3404 disregards the importance of legal advice. Veterans must
rely instead on the assistance of veterans' service organizations whose
60. A-Test Vets, supra note 57, at 27.
61. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17 (statement of Dr. Karl Morgan).
62. See Health Effects Hearings, supra note 56, at 279-83 (1970 AEC Study), at 251 (statement of
Maj. Alan Skerker).
63. Letter from William G. Meyers to Stafford L. Warren (Dec. 31, 1946).
64. Id
65. See Note, Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shifing the Burden of Proof on Factual
Causation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 933 (1981).
66. 38 U.S.C. § 3404 (1976).
67. Id
68. Judicial Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 174-77 (statement of Lewis M. Milford, National
Veterans Law Center).
69. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17 (statement of Frederick Davis, Representative, ABA).
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members, though well-meaning, lack the training and critical skills of
competent legal counsel. Thus, veterans' claims are seldom presented
in the most effective manner.
Attorney participation has been questioned on the ground that it
would increase claimants' costs.70 However, legislation recently passed
by the Senate would prohibit attorney participation until after a Board
of Veterans Appeals decision on the merits of the case.7 After this
stage attorney fees would be limited to five hundred dollars or twenty-
five percent of the amount of past due benefits.72 Any further concern
could be addressed by imposing practical limits on attorney fees.
Even if VA policies were subject to independent judicial review,
such review would be ineffective without repeal of the attorney fee lim-
itation. The assistance of competent counsel is indispensible to effec-
tive court review, particularly in veterans' cases, which frequently
involve complex environmental, scientific, and medical issues. Most
service organizations currently representing veterans have endorsed
both judicial review and repeal of section 3404.13
OPPOSITION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Opponents of judicial review of VA policy and procedure maintain
that such review would make the system adversarial. 4 This argument,
however, overlooks the fact that the appeals process is already adver-
sarial. Unfortunately for the veteran, the opposition acts as both de-
fendant and judge. Proponents of judicial review respond by arguing
that lawyers familiar with agency practice recognize that their role as
an administrative advocate differs from their role in the courtroom.
75
"[T]he administrative lawyer frequently acts to explain a complex
agency [procedure] to a client, attempts to clarify issues for both the
client and the agency, and tries to resolve claims with as little acrimony
as possible."' 6 Where counsel functions in such a role, a disruptive
adversarial atmosphere need not result. In fact, legislation has already
been passed by the Senate which would maintain the current setting by
preserving the aspects most desirable and advantageous to veterans.77
Opponents of judicial review also contend that such review of VA
decisions would overburden the court system.7" This argument is per-
haps their weakest. The increased caseload resulting from judicial re-
70. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17 (statement of John P. Murphy, VA General Counsel).
71. S. 349, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(c)(1), 127 CONG. REC. S809 (daily ed. Jan. 30 1981).
72. S. 636, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S8488, S8492 (daily ed. June 15, 1983).
73. See generally Judicial Review Hearings, supra note 6.
74. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17 (statement of John P. Murphy, VA General Counsel).
75. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17 (statement of Frederick Davis, Representative, ABA).
76. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17 (statement of John Terzano, Legislative Director, Vietnam
Veterans of America).
77. S. 636, supra note 72.
78. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17 (statement of John P. Murphy, VA General Counsel).
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view would be minimal.79 Although a deputy assistant attorney
general estimates that 4,600 additional appeals would result from judi-
cial review,8" his assertion is disputed by Frederick Davis, Dean of the
University of Dayton School of Law.8" Dean Davis believes this pre-
diction is unfounded for three reasons. First, many cases will be with-
drawn, settled, or remanded before they reach the appellate review
stage. Second, since current legislative proposals would dispense with
several of the procedural requirements of the VA claims process, fewer
appeals on procedural grounds would result. 2 Third, veterans seldom
believe their cases are worthy of a hearing and consequently, they will
rarely hire a lawyer to appeal their case.83
The Board of Correction of Military Records (BCMR),8 4 whose de-
cisions are subject to judicial review, has had fewer than one hundred
of its decisions appealed to federal court out of the tens of thousands it
has recorded.85 Any increase in appellate litigation resulting from judi-
cial review of VA decisions should not substantially exceed that of the
BCMR.86
Opponents of judicial review have often cited the adage, "[i]f it ain't
broke, don't fix it." To many observers, the VA system is indeed
"broke." Certainly, the negative image fostered in recent years by the
VA's dogmatic intransigence indicates that something is indeed wrong.
Judicial review would make a difference. As stated by one veterans'
organization, "[r]eview by the courts would provide an explanation of
decision-making and a ventilation of the frustrations of veterans."87
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
The House of Representatives has not voted on judicial review leg-
islation. The primary debate has occurred in the Senate, where the
character of judicial review legislation has been progressively narrowed
from the 95th to the 98th Congress, reflecting concerns about the prac-
79. Judicial Review Hearings, supra note 6, 134, 147-49 (statement of Lewis M. Milford, National
Veterans Law Center).
80. VA Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review Act. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Veterans' Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 401-02 (1977) (statement of Paul Nejelski, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
81. Hearings on S 636, supra note 17 (statement of Frederick Davis, Dean of the University of
Dayton School of Law and past Chairman, House Committee on Veterans' Affairs).
82. Id
83. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17 (statement of John P. Murphy, VA General Counsel). See
also Judicial Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 317 (statement of Hon. William Lehman).
84. The BCMR was created by passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753,
§ 207, 60 Stat. 812, 837 (1947) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1982)).
85. Judicial Review Hearings, supra note 6, at 198 (statement of David F. Addleston, Co-director
of the National Veterans Law Center, on S. 330, as amended, before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, June 20, 1979).





tical breadth of such review.88 Most Senators, however, concur on the
need for some access to the federal court system, particularly with re-
spect to judicial review of VA law and procedures.89
Legislation adopted by the Senate in the 96th Congress would limit
factual review by the court to "arbitrary and capricious" decisions.90
Pursuant to this bill, judicial review would be deferred until the VA was
given an opportunity on remand to reconsider the case record.9' The
report of the Senate Veterans' Committee 92 stated, "[tihis formula was
intended to strike a balance between the proper functions of the re-
viewing court and the Administrator by permitting the court to exercise
its own judgment in resolving issues of law but restricting narrowly the
court's review of questions of fact." 93
However, the 97th Congress saw the "arbitrary and capricious" test
as an imprecise basis for review. 94 Thus, legislation passed by the Sen-
ate in the 97th and 98th Congresses would permit factual review only
when the VA decision is "so utterly lacking in a rational basis in the
evidence that a manifest and grievous injustice would result if [the find-
ing] were not set aside." 95
The proposed legislation would retain the present ten dollar limita-
tion on attorney fees for cases appealed within the VA but resolved
prior to a final decision of the Board of Veterans Appeals. 96 For cases
resolved by the BVA, the fee limitation would be five hundred dollars
or twenty-five percent of the past due benefits awarded the claimant.97
If a case were settled in the veteran's favor outside of the VA, the attor-
ney fee limitation would again be twenty-five percent of the total past
due benefits awarded or a "reasonable" attorney's fee.98 For a case re-
solved against a veteran claimant, the fee would be limited to a maxi-
mum of seven hundred fifty dollars.99
In its efforts to fashion legislation to allow for judicial review of VA
rules, regulations, and findings of fact, the Senate clearly is concerned
with preserving those facets of the present system which are most ad-
vantageous to veterans-free representation before the VA by service
officers of veterans' organizations, liberal standards of evidence admis-
sibility, and prohibition of cross-examination. l°0
Legislation pending in the House of Representatives is virtually
88. Compare S. 636, supra note 72, with S. 330, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S987 (daily
ed. Feb. 1, 1979).
89. See S. 636, supra note 72, at S8495.
90. Hearings on S. 636, supra note 17 (statement of John P. Murphy, VA General Counsel).
91. S. 330, supra note 88.








100. S. 636, supra note 72, at 8490.
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identical to that already adopted by the Senate.' 0 ' Thus far, two days
of House hearings have been held. Notwithstanding the failure of the
House to cooperate in past efforts to resolve this iniquitous dilemma,
given Senate passage of S. 636 and new membership on the House Vet-
erans' Affairs Committee, proponents are hopeful that the House will
follow the Senate's lead and adopt some form of judicial review
legislation.
CONCLUSION
28 U.S.C. § 211 (a), the present law which forecloses judicial review
of decisions by the Veterans Administration denying claims of Ameri-
can veterans seeking benefits for their war-related injuries, is an archaic
and undemocratic law which must be replaced with legislation that al-
lows for a fair and effective appeal from the VA's denial of benefits.
Congress should enact new legislation which requires the VA to set
forth the objective data used in reaching a decision to deny or limit
benefits, and to allow recovery for non-traditional injuries, which,
though not reflected in a veteran's service record, are provable. Addi-
tionally, such new legislation should require more forcefully that the
VA take into account available medical and scientific evidence in issu-
ing its rulings. Lastly, because legal counsel is essential for the effective
enforcement of legal rights, reasonable attorney fees must be allowed.
101. H.R. 1959, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H939 (daily ed. March 8, 1983), and H.R.
3300, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H3962 (1983).
EDITOR'S NOTE
As this article was going to print, the U.S. House of Representatives passed significant
legislation affecting veterans' benefits. On January 30, 1984, H.R. 1961 was passed by voice
vote. The bill, sponsored by Representative Daschle, affords limited compensation to Viet-
nam era veterans suffering from the effects of exposure to Agent Orange and other poten-
tially harmful herbicides and post-World War II and Korean era veterans suffering from
exposure to radiation. The bill would provide $65 to $1,250 per month in benefits to veterans
suffering from specific diseases depending upon the severity of their disability. H.R. 1961
has been sent to the U.S. Senate for consideration.
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